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Abstract: There is an aporia in Kant’s analysis of evil: he defines radical evil 
as an invisible disposition of the will, but he also demands an inferential con-
nection between visible evil actions and this invisible disposition. This infer-
ence, however, undermines the radical invisibility of radical evil according 
to Kant’s own definition of the latter. Noting how this invisibility of moral 
worth is a distinctive feature of Kant’s approach to the moral problem, the 
paper then asks why, in the Groundwork, he nonetheless forecloses a question 
about evil that seems to be consistent with this approach. It is argued that to 
account for this aporia and this foreclosure, one has to interrogate the way in 
which the category of religion orients Kant’s incipient philosophy of history 
in Die Religion.
Keywords: Kant, radical evil, philosophy of religion.
Resumen: Hay una aporía en el análisis kantiano del mal: Kant define el mal 
radical como una disposición de la voluntad invisible, pero también exige 
que esta disposición invisible se pueda inferir a partir de aquellas acciones 
visiblemente malas. Sin embargo, esta inferencia socava el carácter radical-
mente invisible del mal radical según la definición que de éste da el propio 
Kant. Enfatizando la manera en que este carácter invisible del valor moral 
es una característica distintiva de la aproximación kantiana al problema 
moral, se plantea la pregunta de por qué Kant, no obstante, rechaza en la 
Fundamentación una pregunta sobre el mal que parece ser consistente con 
esta aproximación. Se argumenta que para dar cuenta de esta aporía y de este 
rechazo, es necesario interrogar la manera en la que la categoría de la religión 
orienta la incipiente filosofía de la historia esbozada por Kant en Die Religion. 
Palabras clave: Kant, mal radical, filosofía de la religión.
I. The aporia of radical evil
Following his distinctive way of inquiring, one of the central questions that Kant addresses in the first installment of his Die 
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793), is about the 
a priori conditions of possibility that may account for the pervasive 
existence of evil observed throughout the spectacle of human 
existence; and hence, that may account for our naming this or that 
1 Candidato a Doctorado en filosofía de la religión.
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action, person, or event, as “evil”. As is always the case in his path of 
thought, the point of departure for the inquiry is a linguistic factum (a 
judgment) that calls for an elucidation regarding the transcendental 
(non-empirical) grounds that make this factum in the first place 
possible; or, in other words, an elucidation of the transcendental 
grounds that allow us to account for some of our judgments, not 
as random or arbitrary propositions that could well be absent or 
falsified given other circumstances, but rather as referring to certain 
“necessary” and constitutive characteristics of human existence2. In 
this text the question for Kant is not: there are synthetic judgments a 
priori, so how are they possible?; nor is it: there are moral judgments 
in which we say “this is good”, or there are those other judgments 
in which we say “this is beautiful”, so how are they possible?; the 
question now is rather: there is evil; we judge sometimes this or that 
action, person, or event, as evil, so how is such a judgment possible?; 
and what do mean when, in such instances, we say “evil”? Such is 
the question that the first part of Die Religion is concerned with, a 
question that for Kant becomes urgent given the overwhelming 
evidence he finds of a human propensity to evil, or, in his own words 
“the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human 
deeds parades before us” (R 80 / 6:32)3. In virtue of this evidence, 
says Kant, “we can spare ourselves the formal proof that there must 
be such a corrupt [moral] propensity rooted in the human being”(R 
80 / 6:32). Under the burden of this recognition, he distances himself 
2 This question about the a priori conditions of the possibility of evil is inextricably 
connected to the other central question that Kant addresses in Part I: since evil pertains 
to the moral realm of imputability its ultimate source must be a “free choice” of the 
will, and therefore the characterization of the a priori “necessary” conditions from 
which evil derives must be compatible with the understanding of evil as an outcome 
of human freedom. This results in the apparent antinomy that an evil disposition of 
the will must be at the same time the ground of all evil deeds and, at the same time, 
be itself a (freely chosen) deed, an antinomy that Kant resolves with the distinction 
between a noumenal and a phenomenal deed. Starting our discussion from a different 
angle and postponing for the moment the explicit mention of this problem concerning 
the relation between freedom and evil we are not, however, ignoring it. In this respect, 
it should however be kept in mind that when he refers to the a priori ground of evil 
as “necessary”, Kant does not mean that the predicate “evil” can be inferred from the 
concept of a human being in general (in which case it would not be the outcome of 
freedom), but as he himself says, that “according to the cognition we have of the human 
being through experience, he cannot be judged otherwise, in other words, we may 
presuppose evil as subjectively necessary in every human being” (R 80 / 6:32). And 
yet, as we shall soon see, Kant also insistently says, that the judgment that a human 
being is “evil” cannot be based in experience. This is one form of the aporia that this 
first part of the paper attempts to expose. 
3 Cf. Kant 1996. (All the quotations from Kant’s “Religion” are taken from this edi-
tion; the quotes will be followed first by the page number of the English translation 
and then the original page number of the German standard edition). 
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both from the Rousseaunian nostalgia for the natural goodness of 
the “savage” corrupted by the advance of “civilization”, as well 
as from the enlightened optimism in the triumph of “civilization” 
over the irrational perversity of the “savage”. Kant encounters an 
overwhelming evidence of evil in both scenarios: on the one hand, 
as he calls them, “the vices of savagery”, and on the other hand “the 
vices of culture and civilization” (R 80-81 / 6:33). The assessment of 
the universality of evil that this evidence entails, discredits in equal 
measure the nostalgic pessimism of the romantic as well as the naive 
optimism of the enlightened bourgeois.
It is in this manner that the first part of Die Religion is devoted to 
a detailed consideration of the question of evil. However, despite 
such experiential attestation of the existence of “evil”, despite such 
“overwhelming evidence”, what this rich and complex text attempts 
to provide is precisely an understanding of moral evil that displaces 
the criteria of moral worth from the phenomenal appearance of 
certain actions recognized and named as evil, to the invisible inward 
disposition from which these actions arise. In Kant’s own words: 
We call a human being evil not because he performs actions 
that are evil (contrary to law), but because they are so consti-
tuted that they allow the inference of evil maxims in him. Now 
through experience we can indeed notice unlawful [gesetzwidrig] 
actions, and also notice (at least within ourselves) that they are 
consciously contrary to law. But we cannot observe maxims, we 
cannot do so un-problematically even within ourselves; hence 
the judgment that an agent is an evil human being cannot reliably be 
based on experience. In order, then, to call a human being evil, it 
must be possible to infer a priori from a number of consciously 
evil actions, or even from a single one, an underlying evil maxim, 
and, from this, the presence in the subject of a common ground, 
itself a maxim, of all particularly morally evil maxims. (R 70 / 
6:20; my emphasis)
 
Moral evil is, then, no longer to be considered as the transgression 
of the content of a specific moral law (do not lie, pay your debts, do 
not kill, etc.), but as a certain inward disposition, a certain inflexion 
of the will (which Kant here and elsewhere calls a maxim), that, 
though in itself invisible, must let itself be inferred on the basis of 
such visible transgressions. One of the main purposes of this first 
section of Die Religion is to determine and characterize the configu-
ration of this inflexion of the will which itself constitutes the source 
of moral evil. When we say that this or that action is evil, what we 
mean is not that such an action transgresses some norm, or some 
prescription of conduct, but rather that it is done out of a certain 
disposition of the will, a certain maxim. To understand what moral 
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evil is, then, amounts to understanding what is the configuration of 
this inflexion of the will, which can alone be properly called “evil” 
in a moral sense. In a way, Kant is replicating here in his analysis of 
evil the same revolutionary movement introduced in the analysis of 
the question of moral goodness articulated in the Groundwork: what 
matters in relation to moral worth is not so much what is done, but 
rather the how of this doing. Nonetheless, one finds an intriguing 
asymmetry between the analysis of the constitution of a good will 
undertaken in the Groundwork, and the approach taken here in the 
analysis and understanding of an evil will. In the first case, it is im-
possible to make an inference from an apparently good action, i.e., 
from an action that conforms to the specific content of the moral 
law(s), or even from a whole series of this kind of lawful actions, 
to a good moral disposition from which these actions arise4. From 
the perspective of the phenomenal appearance of human conduct 
there may well be absolutely no difference between a good or an evil 
will. Moral worth is in this sense, for Kant, radically opaque, hid-
den, even inaccessible, from a phenomenological perspective. By its 
very definition, moral worth does not appear, does not show itself, 
it remains inescapably hidden in what in Die Religion Kant calls the 
“depths of the heart”. In this text he emphasizes in several passages, 
once again, this point initially articulated in the Groundwork; among 
them the following where he establishes the distinction between a 
person of good morals and a morally good person: 
So far as the agreement of actions with the law goes, there is no 
difference (or at least there ought to be none) between a human 
being of good morals (bene moratus) and a morally good human 
being (moraliter bonus), except that the actions of the former do 
not always have, perhaps never have, the law as their sole and 
supreme incentive, whereas those of the latter always do. We can 
say of the first that he complies with the law according to the 
letter […er befolge das Gesetz dem Buchstaben nach] (i.e. as regards 
the action commanded by the law); but of the second that he ob-
serves it according to the spirit […er beobachte es dem Geiste nach] 
4 In the Groundwork Kant even stresses the impossibility of such an inference not 
only in the case of empirical observation, but also in the case of introspection or 
self-examination: “In fact it is absolutely impossible to settle with complete certainty 
through experience whether there is even a single case in which the maxim of an 
otherwise dutiful action has rested solely on moral grounds and in the representation 
of one’s duty. For it is sometimes the case that with the most acute self-examination 
we encounter nothing that could have been powerful enough apart from the moral 
ground of duty to move us to this or that good action and to so great a sacrifice; but 
from this it cannot be safely inferred that it was not actually some covert impulse of self-
love, under the mere false pretense of that idea, that was the real determining cause 
of the will […]” (G 23 / 4: 407; my emphasis).
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(the spirit of the moral law consists in the law being of itself a 
sufficient incentive). (R 78 / 6:30)
 
By the end of this paragraph Kant adds that in the case of “the 
person of good morals” (bene moratus) who complies with the letter 
of the law without being attuned with its spirit, “the human being, 
despite all his good actions is nevertheless evil” (R 78 / 6:31). 
But if the inference from phenomenological appearance to the 
inflexion or disposition of the will is precluded in the case of the 
determination of moral goodness, it seems to be not only allowed 
but even more required in the case of the determination of moral 
evil: “In order, then, to call a human being evil, it must be possible to 
infer a priori from a number of consciously evil actions, or even from 
a single one, an underlying evil maxim” (R 70 / 6:20; my emphasis). 
Why is this inference from the sphere of phenomenological appear-
ance to the inwardness and secrecy of the will necessary in the case 
of the determination of moral evil, but impossible in the case of the 
determination of moral goodness? What is the reason for this asym-
metry? In the terms introduced in Die Religion, one could say that 
the necessary character of this inference from phenomenal appear-
ance to the invisibility of the will in the case of moral evil forecloses 
the possibility of a transgression of the letter of the moral law that is 
somehow attuned with its spirit. There may well be an evil will hid-
den under the appearance of good actions, but there cannot be a good 
will hidden under the appearance of evil actions. The “good citizen” 
may well harbor an evil heart, but the “criminal” or the “outlaw” 
cannot be thought of as harboring a good one5.
In the very typology, already mentioned above, in which Kant 
divides the examples gathered in his empirical attestation of the al-
leged universality of the propensity to evil in the human being, one 
already encounters a difficulty entailed in the presumed “visibility” 
of such examples. Kant divides his examples in two groups: the 
5 Although the description of “frailty” as the first degree of the propensity to evil 
in the human condition, indeed allows the thought of this possibility; Kant describes 
“frailty” in the following terms: “The frailty of human nature is expressed even in 
the complaint of an Apostle: ‘What I would, that I do not’ i.e., I incorporate the good 
(the law) into the maxim of my power of choice; but this good, which is an irresistible 
incentive objectively or ideally (in thesi), is subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in 
comparison with inclination) whenever the maxim is to be followed” (R 77 / 6:30). 
This motif of “frailty”, which opens the possibility of a visible transgression of the 
law nonetheless bound to a moral inflexion of inwardness, i.e., to the “incorporation 
of the good into the maxim of my power of choice”, would certainly deserve closer 
examination in relation to the main argument of this paper. Nonetheless, the situation 
of “frailty” still seems to differ from the aporia in Kant’s analysis of radical evil which 
this paper attempts to explore, but the relation between the former and the latter 
certainly requires further elaboration. 
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“vices” found in the uncivilized “state of nature” of certain “savages”, 
and those he refers to as “the vices of culture and civilization”. The 
former are visible in the form of explicit and excessive violence, 
of “unprovoked” and “never-ending cruelty” (R 80 / 6:33). But a 
quality of hiddenness seems to be a constitutive feature of the latter: 
“secret falsity even in the most intimate friendship”, or “a propen-
sity to hate him to whom we are indebted”, or “many other vices 
yet hidden under the appearance of virtue” […vielen andern unter dem 
Tugendscheine noch verborgenen] (R 81 / 6:33; my emphasis). If the 
“vices of culture and civilization” are hidden, one is then prompted 
to ask how is it possible for Kant to gather them here in the form of 
empirical evidence, as part of the “woeful examples that the experi-
ence of human deeds parades before us”. If they are hidden under the 
appearance of virtue, this means precisely that they do not appear as 
“vices”, even more, that they do not appear at all. How can this kind 
of “vices”, then, be pointed out as part of the “multitude of woeful 
examples” that constitute the overwhelming empirical evidence of 
the existence of a morally “evil” disposition in human nature? How 
is this invisible “evidence” supposed to be seen?
Perhaps aware of precisely this difficulty Kant rectifies, then, his 
line of argument and leaves aside the a posteriori attestation of a pro-
pensity to evil in human nature based on the gathering of examples. 
He recognizes that these examples cannot “teach us the real nature 
of that propensity or the grounds of this resistance [of the human 
power of choice against the law]” (R 82 / 6:35), and states that such 
an elucidation requires rather the a priori articulation of the concept 
of moral evil, i.e., the identification of the so to say transcendental 
ground of the phenomenon of evil, and then provides such an a priori 
definition. This rectification in his argument is also in concordance 
with one of Kant’s most important methodological principles: that 
mere empirical observation is always an insufficient source to deter-
mine the constitutive structure of a phenomenon, and much less this 
phenomenon’s necessity or universality. 
It is in this shift in his argumentation towards the a priori elucida-
tion of the transcendental ground of moral evil, that Kant formu-
lates his well known characterization of radical evil as a “reversal 
of incentives”. Through this “reversal” the will subordinates the 
incentive of the moral law to the incentive of self-interest, or, in 
other words, regards the (external) conformity to the moral law 
as a means to securing the incentives of self-interest, instead of 
subordinating the latter to the unconditional compliance required 
by the moral law, that should always be an end in itself. In Kant’s 
own words, moral evil is thus characterized as a movement through 
which the will “makes the incentives of self-love and their inclina-
tions the condition of compliance to the moral law” (R 83 / 6:37). 
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The will decides to conform to the letter of the moral law inasmuch 
as such conformity is conceived as a condition towards the secur-
ing of happiness, as a “good deal”. This compliance to the letter of 
the moral law associated with the inner disposition that constitutes 
radical evil, is the reason why it is so crucial for Kant to stress the 
radical invisibility of moral worth, i.e., that from the perspective of 
the phenomenal appearance of human conduct there may well be 
absolutely no difference between a good or an evil will. Even more, 
the assumption of the contrary, i.e., that the empirical evidence of 
external conduct can be in itself an indication of moral worth is an 
unequivocal expression of an “attitude of mind” that he designates 
as the “radical perversity in the human heart”:
[E]ven though a lawless action and a propensity to such con-
trariety, i.e. vice, do not always originate from it, the attitude of 
mind that construes the absence of vice as already being conformity to 
the disposition to the law of duty (i.e. as virtue) is nonetheless itself 
to be named a radical perversity in the human heart (for in this case 
no attention at all is given to the incentives in the maxim but 
only to compliance with the letter of the law). (R 84 / 6:37; my 
emphasis)
Pressing this same point further Kant characterizes, some lines 
ahead, this “radical perversity in the human heart” as a dishonesty 
that “puts out of tune the moral ability to judge what to think of 
a human being, and renders any imputability entirely uncertain, 
whether internal or external” (R 85 / 6:38). In his examination of the 
Kantian doctrine of radical evil Henry Allison, reminding us that 
this “radical perversity of the human heart” has been previously 
identified by Kant as the third and highest degree of the propensity 
to evil in human nature (after fragility and impurity), gives us an 
accurate and succinct account of the dishonesty constitutive of this 
evil disposition of inwardness, in terms of self-deception:
Kant suggests that a fundamental feature of this third stage is a 
kind of systematic self-deception. The idea here is that one tells 
oneself that one is doing all that morality requires as long as one’s 
overt behavior agrees with the law. Accordingly, Kant suggests 
that this stage can coexist with a certain ungrounded moral self-
satisfaction, which stems from the fact that one has simply been 
fortunate in avoiding those circumstances that would have led 
to actual immoral behavior. (Allison 158; my emphasis)
But put in these terms, the definition of radical evil could have a 
shocking consequence that is, however, not explicitly acknowledged 
by Kant (nor by Allison). If radical evil is defined in terms of this kind 
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of dishonesty (an evil moral disposition hidden under the appear-
ance of virtue), then the blatant and un-hidden transgressions of 
the moral law cannot be regarded as expressions of that “attitude of 
mind” [Denkungsart] which constitutes radical evil insofar as, in such 
cases, the very explicitness and visibility of in-morality exhibited by 
such un-hidden transgressions, precludes the very possibility of evil 
qua dishonesty and self-deception, this is, of evil qua radical evil. In 
other words, visible evil cannot be the manifestation of radical evil, 
because according to its very definition the latter is one that hides 
itself under the appearance of virtue. 
This is certainly not what Kant has in mind. As was already noted, 
concerning the question of evil his project is to determine the tran-
scendental grounds that may account for the empirical instances of 
evil actions observed throughout human experience. He describes 
the project as that of making an inference into the evil maxim (the 
subjective ground of the will) that underlies the phenomenal ap-
pearance of evil. In this vein he states, in the very first paragraph of 
Part I of Die Religion, already quoted above: “We call a human being 
evil not because he performs actions that are evil (contrary to law), 
but because they are so constituted that they allow the inference of 
evil maxims in him” (R 70 / 6:20). Right away, nevertheless, he puts 
into question the very possibility of this inference by recognizing 
that: “we cannot observe maxims, we cannot do so un-problemati-
cally even within ourselves; hence the judgment that an agent is an 
evil human being cannot reliably be based on experience” (R 70 
/ 6:20). The tension is forcefully present in the phrasing of these 
opening sentences: moral evil must be identified in the inward 
maxim and not in this or that empirically observable action; but 
visibly evil actions may nonetheless “allow” the inference of the 
evil maxim from which they derive. But if we cannot rely on the 
empirical observation of actions in order to assess their moral worth, 
we have no criteria left for identifying certain actions as “evil” that 
would “allow” us to infer from them the invisible principle (maxim) 
from which they presumably derive. In order to infer an evil maxim 
from evil actions we have to be able to know that certain actions are 
evil, to recognize them as such; but we can only know whether an 
action is evil if we first know the maxim from which it derives.
In the very statement of the project of seeking the transcendental 
(noumenal) conditions of possibility of the phenomenon of evil there 
seems to be, then, an aporia. Perhaps this aporia could be further 
characterized in terms of the impossibility of reconciling, on the one 
hand, a direct connection or continuity between the phenomenal 
instances of evil observable in human experience and an inward 
evil disposition which “no one sees”; and, on the other hand, in 
an inescapable friction with this alleged continuity, the radical 
11
RADICAL EVIL AND THE INVISIBILITY OF MORAL WORTH 
Nº 135  DICIEMBRE DE 2007
incommensurability between the phenomenality of human conduct 
and the invisibility of the will that is so crucial in the articulation of 
Kant’s understanding of the moral problem. The direct continuity 
between the visible and the invisible dimensions of evil requires a 
certain inference that the incommensurability between the visible 
“outside” and the invisible “inside”, the inaccessibility from one to 
the other, precludes.
The role of this incommensurability in Kant’s analysis of radical 
evil, has led some of the interpreters of this difficult text to claim 
that this analysis entails a series of consequences which are “morally 
scandalous”. In this vein, for example, Richard Bernstein has pointed 
out to what he calls “a troubling consequence” of Kant’s analysis 
of evil. He notes how, contrary to all expectations, in the charac-
terization of wickedness [Bosartigkeit] as the third (and highest) 
degree of the “propensity to evil in human nature”, “wickedness” 
is not conceived by Kant as “some horrendous type or form of evil” 
(Bernstein 71), but rather as a subtle and perhaps even unnotice-
able arrangement of the will’s incentives. An arrangement which, 
furthermore (as we have insisted above), could be in Kant’s view 
accompanied by an irreproachably lawful conduct, a conduct that 
is, in all respects, correct. It is this radical invisibility of radical evil 
what Bernstein finds so troubling in Kant’s analysis, insofar as it 
undermines the very possibility of establishing a moral distinction 
between the “good citizen” and the “criminal” (i.e., the very possi-
bility of making an inference from the legal to the moral spheres). To 
express his indignation, Bernstein rhetorically pushes the point a bit 
further by depicting the “good citizen” as the “sympathetic person” 
who helps others out of a natural inclination (i.e., not by incorporat-
ing the moral law as the supreme and unconditional incentive of the 
will), and the criminal as the “mass murderer”, and by then noting 
that: 
On the basis of Kant’s characterization of wickedness, such a 
self-consciously motivated sympathetic person whose actions 
are ‘lawfully good’ is a paradigm of wickedness. He has a cast 
of mind that is corrupted at the root, and he must be ‘designated 
as evil’. […] But to judge such a person to be an exemplar of 
wickedness; to judge his maxims –in respect to the degree of 
evil- to be in the same category as those of the mass murderer is 
much more than an awkward consequence; it is morally perverse. 
(Bernstein 71; my emphasis) 
For Bernstein, then, it is morally perverse to regard moral worth 
as utterly invisible or, in other words, to establish a fracture between 
“legality” and “morality” in the way Kant does (i.e., between what 
Kant would also call the “letter” and the “spirit” of the law), such 
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that it is impossible to “see” or recognize any moral worth in the 
mere conformity to the law (only on the basis of such a recognizable 
visibility of moral value could one then sharply oppose the moral 
worth of the “sympathetic good person” and the “criminal”). For 
Kant, nonetheless, it is exactly the other way around: what he con-
siders “morally perverse” is to assume that it is possible to discern 
moral worth on the basis of the mere conformity to the law: 
[T]he attitude of mind that construes the absence of vice [the mere 
conformity to the law] as already being conformity to the dispo-
sition to the law of duty (i.e. as virtue) is nonetheless itself to be 
named a radical perversity in the human heart. (R 84 / 6:37)
Bernstein’s scandalized indignation, hence, is symptomatic of the 
profound and disturbing displacement in the very approach to the 
moral question that is effected in Kant’s analysis of radical evil: the 
establishment of an insurmountable rupture between the visible 
surface of conduct and the invisible depth of a moral inflexion of the 
will in which, then, the entire question of moral worth is situated. 
This radical displacement effected by Kant’s moral philosophy is 
not exclusive of this later text, but rather, informs his very formu-
lation of the moral problem since as early as the Groundwork. One 
could not, as Bernstein would pretend to do, keep Kant’s moral 
philosophy and get rid of his perplexing analysis of evil, because 
both are ultimately articulated on the basis of the same fundamental 
intuition: the displacement of moral worth from the visible surface 
of conduct to the invisible depth of the will. Instead of a scandalized 
indignation that is ultimately grounded in nothing else but an unex-
amined “common sense” and “moral sensibility”, a “common sense” 
which Kant’s philosophical analysis attempted precisely to disqualify 
as a source of moral judgments, one should rather ask why Kant 
retracted from the radical displacement distinctive of his own ap-
proach to the moral problem; and, furthermore, ask not only what 
are the conceptual consequences of this retraction, such as the aporia 
in which his analysis of radical evil is entangled as we have tried to 
show, but also what are the historico-political “hidden springs” and 
implications of this retraction, which, in its turn, might well approxi-
mate to the “hidden springs” that underpin the scandalized moral 
sensibility of interpreters like Bernstein.
II. A question regarding the foreclosure of a question in 
the Groundwork
Kant’s understanding of radical evil in Die Religion, then, opens the 
same fracture between phenomenal visibility and hidden inwardness 
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that was already established in the Groundwork in his understanding 
of moral goodness. One is intrigued, then, by how this fracture be-
tween visibility and invisibility, effected with extreme thoroughness 
by his analysis of the question about ‘moral goodness’ (a fracture 
which in its most radical formulations is presented as irreparable), 
tends nonetheless to be either passed over or finally repaired when 
it is a matter of thinking about ‘moral evil’. One is intrigued by why 
the destabilizing and disturbing putting into question of the ‘good-
ness’ of what appears as ‘good behavior’, is not replicated with the 
same strenuousness when it is a matter of putting into question 
the ‘evilness’ of what appears as ‘evil behavior’. One asks why the 
affirmation of the at once poignant and elusive inflexion of the will 
which Kant calls ‘respect for the moral law’, or ‘freedom’, is so firm 
in making tremble what one would call (with the necessary precau-
tion that such encapsulations demand) a certain bourgeois moral 
self-complacency, but is at the same time so wavering when it is a 
matter of undermining and putting into question the repulsion that 
the uncivilized-criminal-unrest has always inspired in the ‘civilized 
world’, then and now. In this section of the paper, I will attempt 
to retrace this intrigue back to the opening formulations of Kant’s 
analysis of the moral problem in the first pages of the Groundwork, 
in order to identify a certain question regarding moral evil that re-
mains foreclosed in this analysis, and to identify, as well, the argu-
mentative devices through which such a foreclosure is sealed. In the 
third and last section of the paper I will come back to examine what 
this foreclosure might entail and how can one account for it, in the 
context of other important aspects of Kant’s philosophical analysis 
of religion in Die Religion.
In order to formulate this intrigue from within the Kantian text 
itself one needs to read it very closely. In the opening pages of the 
Groundwork, for instance, when what is at stake is the definition of 
the concept of a “good will” through the notion of duty, we encoun-
ter the denial of a question, the passing over [übergehen] a question:
I pass over all actions that are already recognized as contrary to 
duty […] for with them the question cannot arise at all whether 
they might be done from duty, since they even conflict with it. 
(G 13 / 4:397)6 
6 (All the quotes from the Groundwork are from Yale edition, and the English 
translation’s page number is followed by the page number of the Akademie Ausgabe, 
from which the German original is also quoted occasionally). [ich übergehe hier alle 
Handlungen, die schon als pflicht-widrig erkannt werden (…) denn bei denen ist gar nicht ein-
mal die Frage, ob sie aus Pflicht geschehen sein mögen, da sie dieser sogar widerstreiten].
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And yet, one wonders what does it finally mean for an action to be 
‘contrary to duty’ [Pflicht-widrig], and is lead to ask if the distinctive 
articulation of this matter in Kant’s argument makes it indeed so un-
problematic to recognize [erkennen] such actions; if it makes indeed 
of this recognition a procedure in which “there is not even once the 
question […]” [nicht einmal die Frage…]. Because, even granting that 
if there were actions which could be un-problematically recognized 
as contrary to duty (let us say “evil” actions), then there would be 
no question about whether if such actions have been performed out 
of duty [aus Pflicht], the question still remains: is it the case that an 
action can be so un-problematically recognized as contrary to duty, 
as Pflicht-widrig, and how so? With this in mind, if one follows the 
definition of the concept of duty given by Kant as “the necessity of 
an action from respect for the law” (G 16 / 4:400) [aus Achtung fur 
Gesetz], one has to conclude that an action contrary to duty would 
be one which is not necessitated by this peculiar inward disposition 
that Kant calls respect. Defined in this manner duty is, then, not a 
specific behavior, not a specific action or set of actions, but rather an 
inflexion of the will. If this is the case, though, to recognize an action 
as contrary to duty would amount to probe the depths of inward-
ness, to measure its inflexion, its tonality, a procedure of probing 
and measuring which Kant himself, very soon in his argument, will 
explicitly regard as impossible. In fact, after having effected this 
radical displacement of the center of gravity of the moral problem 
from the (visible) appearance of any action or practice to the (invis-
ible) inner disposition that is somehow connected to it, Kant’s line of 
argument arrives to the conclusion that moral worth can never be 
seen: “because when we are talking about moral worth, it does not 
depend on the actions which one sees, but on the inner principles, 
which one does not see” (G 17 / 4:407) [wenn vom moralischen Werte 
die Rede ist, es nicht auf die Handlungen ankommt, die man sieht, sondern 
auf jener inneren Prinzipien derselben, die man nicht sieht]. How is it 
then, that certain actions can be so un-problematically recognized 
[erkannt werden] as immoral, and then passed over, if when it comes 
to the thinking about moral worth it all depends on an inflexion of 
the will that cannot be recognized in what shows itself to be seen? 
How could this inflexion be so easily grasped, decided upon, on 
those cases that appear as transgression of the moral law, and 
nevertheless be un-recognizable, un-decidable, on those cases that 
appear to conform to it? Why does the inwardness of ‘the criminal’, 
of the ‘outlaw’, remain so unquestionably transparent, while that of 
the ‘good citizen’ becomes so drastically opaque, so that it is so easy 
to decide (to see and to recognize by seeing) the ‘evilness’ of those 
practices that appear to be ‘evil’, and yet so difficult, even more, 
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impossible7, to decide upon the ‘goodness’ of those that appear to 
be ‘good’?
Still, when this “passing over” takes place in the opening pages of 
the Groundwork one certainly follows the logic of Kant’s argument 
in all its apparently unquestionable transparency. We all know the 
story well. The point is to distinguish in the sharpest possible way 
those actions done out of duty [aus Pflicht], from, on the other hand, 
those actions whose subjective ground is what Kant calls “inclina-
tion” [Neigung]. He wants to reduce his analysis to the most critical 
type of actions, those in which this distinction is the most difficult 
to establish since they are at the same time in conformity with duty 
and also the object of an ‘immediate’ inclination. Also, it should be 
noted that at this point it is a matter of a conceptual differentiation 
and not a question of whether one is able to recognize this difference 
in experience. First we establish the conceptual difference, first we 
define in all its rigor the concept of a ‘good will’ through the concept 
of duty, and then we ask if it is possible to recognize a ‘good will’ in 
experience or not. Perhaps, then, the reasoning in the previous para-
graph was too hasty and, perhaps more, it reflects an incompetence to 
follow the logic of Kant’s argument. Perhaps it is not legitimate at all 
to point at this previously quoted passage with suspicion and claim 
that there is a certain gap, a certain omission, since the matter could 
not be more clear: when he talks about “passing over” those actions 
already recognized as “contrary to duty”, for with them “there is not 
even once the question” if they could be done “out of duty”, Kant is 
working out the definition of a concept, the concept of a “good will”, 
a definition for which he needs to clarify what does duty mean, since 
a “good will” is precisely that which performs dutiful actions out of 
duty alone, and not out of an immediate or a mediated inclination. If 
a good will is that which performs dutiful actions out of duty alone, to 
understand what is at stake in this ‘out of duty alone’ on which all the 
definition relies at this point, it is useless to ponder on those unduti-
ful actions since, being contrary to duty, it is impossible (there is no 
way, there is no chance) that they could be done out of duty alone. 
In view of this impossibility, there is “not even once the question”. 
Perhaps this is all there is to it, all that is at stake in what was previ-
ously called with unjustified and perhaps premature suspicion, the 
“passing over” [übergehe] a question. 
7 “In fact it is absolutely impossible to settle with complete certainty through 
experience whether there is even a single case in which the maxim of an otherwise 
dutiful action has rested solely on moral grounds […]” (G 23 / 4:407) [“In der Tat ist 
es schlechterdings unmöglich, durch Erfahrung einen einzigen Fall mit völliger Gewissheit 
auszumachen, da die Maxime einer sonst pflichtmässigen Handlung lediglich auf moralischen 
Gründen und auf der Vorstellung seiner Pflicht beruhet habe”].
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But perhaps not. In order to decide the issue it would be necessary 
to make a pause, to allow oneself to be captured by these actions 
‘contrary to duty’, to not pass them over, even if one follows the 
clarity and transparency of the logic (and the strategy) of Kant’s ar-
gument. Make a pause and ponder on the impossibility prescribed 
by the strategy of this logic (and the logic of this strategy): It is 
impossible that an action contrary to duty could be done out of duty. 
What is the logic that grounds this premise? What is the necessity 
of this logic? Is it a purely logical necessity, such that “an undutiful 
action done out of duty” would be a self-contradictory statement, a 
proposition that annuls itself in its absurdity, in its impossibility? Is 
the thought of an “undutiful action done out of duty” as impossible 
and self-annulling as the thought “not x and x”? This would be so 
only if “duty” had the same meaning in the two terms of the state-
ment: “an action contrary to duty” (“an undutiful action”), and “an 
action done out of duty” (“a dutiful action”). But one soon realizes 
this is not the case in the thread of Kant’s argument, because in the 
first term of the statement “duty” is meant in the sense of the specific 
content of a “moral law”, whereas in the second the term “duty” is 
meant in the sense of “respect for the moral law”. Consequently, the 
apparently contradictory statement “an unditiful dutiful action” 
(meaning “an action contrary to duty done out of duty”) could be 
translated for “an action contrary to the content of the moral law 
done out of respect for the law”. Still, though, the statement appears 
to be a contradiction: is it possible to think of “an action against 
the content of the law done out of respect for the law?” But now, 
nevertheless, it is clear that at least the contradiction could not be 
a logical one (such as “not x and x”), because there is a crucial dif-
ference between the two terms: “conformity to the (content) of the 
moral law” and “respect for the moral law”, such that the opposite 
of the former does not amount to the negation of the latter (as in 
“not x and y”). Even more, if the thought of an “unlawful action 
done out of respect for the law” were a logical contradiction (“not x 
and x”), then the proposition obtained from the replacement of the 
first term for its opposite (“x and x”), would be a tautology. Hence, 
it would be a tautology to say: “an action in conformity to the moral 
law done out of respect for the law”; but it is precisely the entire at-
tempt of Kant’s moral philosophy to show that this statement is not 
a tautology because there is an abyss, a fundamental difference, the 
difference that in its subtlety makes the whole difference in relation 
to the moral problem, between “conformity to the law” and “respect 
for the law”. If it is, then, not a logical necessity that which precludes 
as impossible the thought of “an action contrary to duty done out of 
duty” [ist gar nicht einmal die Frage], then what kind of necessity is it, 
and why should we be bound by it? Should we be bound by it? 
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It is, then, important to note that as far as inwardness (i.e., the 
invisibility of the will’s inflexion, or as Kant calls it, of the will’s 
maxim) becomes more and more the center of gravity of the moral 
problem, the distinction between conformity to duty without respect 
and contrariety to duty without respect (a distinction with which 
Kant is operating when he “passes over” the question about those 
actions ‘contrary to duty’, in order to examine rather those that are 
‘in conformity with duty’) becomes less and less relevant. It tends 
to efface itself, insofar as ‘contrariety to duty’ is itself defined as the 
absence of respect (“duty is the necessity of an action from respect to 
the moral law”); hence, to be ‘contrary’ to duty, to be against duty, 
is to lack that peculiar inflexion of the will called respect, in which 
case “conformity to duty without respect” would make no sense, 
and “contrariety to duty without respect” would be a mere tautol-
ogy. But still, up to a certain point in the argument the distinction 
makes sense, and it does so only in virtue of a certain ambivalence 
that haunts not only the concept of “duty”, but also the concept of 
the “moral law”. The distinction makes sense if “duty” and “law” 
refer to the specific content of certain prescriptions for conduct: do 
not lie, pay your debts, do not kill yourself or anyone else, etc. In 
that case, one can act in conformity or in contrariety to the content of 
these prescriptions, and although one can still be ‘immoral’ in both 
cases if one does not act ‘out of respect’, it still makes a difference 
for Kant insofar as in the case of the behavior in contrariety to the 
specific content of these prescriptions there can be no question about 
its ‘immorality’, whereas in the case of the behavior in conformity 
to it the question remains open. But, if “duty” and “law” do not 
mean the content of a prescription for conduct but rather an inflexion 
of inwardness referred to as respect, and the whole gravity of the 
moral problem relies on the extent to which the will is attuned or not 
with this inflexion of inwardness, the difference between external 
conformity or transgression of the content of certain prescriptions for 
conduct tends to become more and more irrelevant.
In the Groundwork, Kant’s text oscillates between these two conno-
tations of the concept of duty: “duty” as the content of a prescription 
for conduct, or “duty” as an inflexion of inwardness, of the will. One 
should note precisely this oscillation operating in the passage previ-
ously quoted where we pointed out the foreclosure of the question 
whether an action ‘contrary to duty’ [Pflicht-widrig] could be ‘done 
from duty’ [aus Pflicht geschehen]: “I pass over all actions that are 
already recognized as contrary to duty [content of a prescription for 
conduct] […] for with them the question cannot arise at all whether 
they might be done from duty [inflexion of the will], since they even 
conflict with it”. The same semantic ambivalence operates through-
out the text with the concept of the “moral law”, which sometimes 
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means the specific content(s) of the prescription(s) of certain actions 
(as when Kant speaks of ‘conformity to the law’), and sometimes it 
means rather the mere form of the law devoid of any specific content 
(as when Kant speaks of ‘respect for the law’). The following pas-
sage, which comes right after the first formulation of the categorical 
imperative, indicates these two possible meanings of the law [Gesetz]: 
“Here it is merely lawfulness in general (without grounding it on any 
law determining certain actions), that serves the will as its principle 
[…]” (G 18 / 4:402) [“Hier ist nun die blosse Gesetzmässigkeit überhaupt 
(ohne irgend ein auf gewisse Handlungen bestimmtes Gesetz zum Grunde 
zu legen) […]“]. 
The subjective imprint of the moral law in its purely formal sense 
as “mere lawfulness in general”, devoid of any specific content, is 
the inflexion of the will characterized as “respect”. But even if Kant 
establishes this distinction between the “law” as content and the 
“law” as form of inwardness (a distinction which later in Die Religion 
will be formulated as that between the letter and the spirit of the law 
[R 78 / 6:30]), the persistent semantic ambivalence in his text that 
makes the argument oscillate between these two meanings almost 
inadvertently, reveals that despite the distinction, the two meanings 
tend to be conflated and regarded as inescapably bound to each 
other. In this sense, the form of inwardness shaped by the “mere 
lawfulness in general”, i.e., by a moral law that cannot be identified 
with any specific content(s), is nonetheless assumed to overlap with 
the content of a specific set of moral law(s), of moral prescription(s), 
clearly conditioned (as they always are) by a particular socio-histori-
cal topos. In virtue of this implicit demand, it is then unconceivable to 
think of a moral law as form of inwardness which manifests itself in 
the transgression of the content of the moral law(s) / prescription(s) 
of this specific socio-historical topos. Even when a radical distinction 
is established between the ‘letter’ and the ‘spirit’ of the law, and 
even when the latter is constituted as the sole center of gravity of the 
moral problem, the possibility of the ‘spirit’ of the law transgressing 
the ‘letter’ of the law remains foreclosed. But what kind of necessity 
or authority dictates this foreclosure? And, should not this authority 
and necessity be put into question?
It is a question, then, about the consistency with which Kant car-
ries out in his texts the revolutionary claim that the moral problem 
is not about what is done, but about the how of what is done; his 
claim that moral worth rests entirely upon an inner how, a very 
peculiar and complicated inflexion of inwardness, and not in the 
performance of a prescribed course of actions. It is a question about 
the implications of this radical movement, a question of whether 
all these implications are followed all the way through by Kant’s 
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thought or not, and if they are not, a question about how could one 
account for the restrain of his thinking from doing so. 
Strictly speaking, once such a fracture has been opened between 
the invisible inner disposition and the visible material content of a 
course of conduct, and once all the emphasis is put on an elusive 
inner how which is inaccessible starting from any what, from any 
empirically observable practice, the same fracture, and the same 
inaccessibility, would have to be acknowledged in the case of the 
practices that conform to the (contents of the) law, and those that 
transgress the (contents of the) law. If what ultimately matters in 
relation to moral worth is the inflexion or disposition of the will, the 
same has to be true for what concerns moral goodness, and what 
concerns moral evil. Which is to say that, since the ground of moral 
worth is the pure inner how (what Kant later in Die Religion will 
repeatedly refer to as “the bottom of the heart” (R 92 / 6:48; 95 / 
6:51) [die Tiefe des Herzens]), and not what conduct is followed, there 
are no longer any external actions which are in themselves morally 
good, since the most dutiful [pflichmässigen] conduct (i.e., a conduct 
that entirely conforms to what the moral law(s) prescribes, to its 
content), may still be grounded on an in-moral (evil) inflexion of 
the will. In the same way, it should have to follow that there are no 
actions which are in themselves morally evil, since even the most evi-
dent transgression of the content of certain (culturally and historically 
circumscribed) law(s) could be connected to a morally good inner 
inflexion of the will. A surprising statement for which, nonetheless, 
one can unexpectedly find a certain support within the Kantian text 
itself, here another text, a footnote in Part One of Die Religion:
Thus the perpetual war between the Arathapescaw Indians and 
the Dog Rib Indians has no other aim than mere slaughter. In 
the savage’s opinion, bravery in war is the highest virtue […] 
That a human being should be capable of adopting as his goal 
something (honor) which he values more highly still than his 
life, and of sacrificing all self-interest to it, this surely bespeaks 
a certain sublimity in his predisposition. (R 80 / 6:33) […beweist 
doch eine gewisse Erhabenheit in seiner Anlage] 
We should certainly not fall into the temptation of over-emphasiz-
ing the import of this surprising, even if highly qualified, gesture 
of deference from Kant’s part towards the “slaughter with no other 
aim” of certain tribes of “savages” in “the wide wastes of North-
western America”. It is a marginal footnote. Still more, this footnote 
appears in the context of an excursus in Kant’s argument intended to 
point out how a mere glance throughout the spectacle of human ex-
perience confronts us with such a “multitude of woeful examples” 
(R 80 / 6:32), that perhaps a formal (a priori) proof that there is a 
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propensity to evil in the human condition is not even necessary. 
There is no question, then, that the blatant cruelty and violence 
exhibited by these “savages” is regarded by Kant as an undeniable 
manifestation of moral evil. Nonetheless, it is highly intriguing that 
such blatant cruelty and violence “with no other aim” can be, none-
theless, associated with a disposition of inwardness in which Kant 
recognizes a “certain sublimity”; i.e., with a certain inflexion or to-
nality of the will that at least in some sense reveals an striking affinity 
with the configuration of a good will. This affinity results from the 
fact that the “savage’s” purposeless evil operates a disruption of the 
logic of calculating self-interest similar to the disruption of this logic 
required by pure practical reason, by the unconditional character of 
the moral imperative. Certain instances of blatant transgression of 
the moral law in which the transgressor’s well-being and life itself 
are risked or injured, wounded, instances of what one would call 
self-destructive evil, on the one hand, and pure respect towards the 
moral law, on the other, both converge in breaking the logic of ra-
tional calculation by means of which economic reason seeks to secure 
the attainment of happiness, the satisfaction of self-interest, through 
the most intelligent means.
This footnote, then, could nevertheless serve us in the manner of a 
hint, an indication. It allows us, at least, to reopen the question fore-
closed in the opening pages of the Groundwork regarding the character 
of those actions “contrary to duty” [Pflicht-werdig Handlungen] that 
are recognized as “evil” because they transgress the content (the letter) 
of certain specific moral law(s). Even more precisely, it allows us to 
reopen the question of whether these actions recognized as “evil” 
could be connected to a good moral disposition or not, or in Kant’s 
own terms, the question of whether an action contrary to duty could 
be done out of duty. But the question now should be, then: why does 
Kant foreclose this question by repairing the fracture between the vis-
ible and invisible dimensions of human conduct in the case of moral 
“evil”, as we have already shown by pointing out the aporia in which 
his analysis of radical evil is, in virtue of this repairing, entangled?
III. The opacity of moral worth and the instability of the 
distinction between “moral” and “cultic” religions
A tentative answer to this question will allow us to move further 
into the final stage of our argument: the question regarding the pos-
sibility of an empirically observable “evil” action, a transgression 
of the content of the law, somehow connected to a good inflexion 
of the will is foreclosed, because ultimately the fracture between 
these visible and invisible dimensions of human conduct must be 
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repaired, not only in the case of moral evil, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, in the case of moral goodness. And this fracture 
needs to be repaired, so that the history of the world can be under-
stood and told in a certain way, according to a narrative in which 
the main role is played by the crucial distinction between two dif-
ferent families of religions, sharply drawn by Kant in Die Religion: 
the “moral religion” and the “cultic religions”. If the “Arathapescaw 
and the Dog Rib Indians” cannot be said to be good, despite a certain 
“sublimity in their disposition” that can be glimpsed in the midst of 
their terrifying and self-destructive violence, it is ultimately because 
their religion is not “moral”, because it is not the true religion which 
alone is a “rational one”, in sum, because they are “savages”, they 
are behind in the march of history. This manner of telling the history 
of the world by means of a distinction between a “true” and a “false” 
modalities of religion (so typical, by the way, of the main figures 
of the Enlightenment), requires that one can identify which is the 
only “moral religion”; and this requires, nothing more and nothing 
less, that one can be able to demarcate, in history, which people are 
“moral” and which people are not. If the very possibility of such a de-
marcation is precisely what has been profoundly problematized and 
undermined, as we have insistently noted, by the fracture opened 
between the phenomenological appearance of conduct and the hid-
denness of the will in the most radical moments of Kant’s analysis 
of moral goodness and radical evil, this fracture has to be repaired, 
so that the “good religion” can prevail over the “bad religions”, in 
history. 
If, as we said above, there is an asymmetry in the manner in 
which the inferential movement from actions to maxims, or from 
observable conduct to the invisible inflexion of the will, is regarded 
as impossible in the case of moral goodness, but necessary in the 
case of moral evil, this is only because the impossibility of such 
inferential movement in the first case, despite being the distinctive 
mark of Kant’s analysis of the moral question, is only a provisional 
impossibility. And this is so, because the very possibility of some-
how discerning on the basis of this inferential movement a progres-
sion towards moral goodness is going to be central to the distinction 
between “moral religion” and “cultic religions” (or “religions of ro-
gation”). As we will see in this last section, if such a discernment of 
“moral improvement” is put into question or rendered problematic, 
the very distinction between a “moral religion” and a “cultic reli-
gion” becomes deeply dubious, or even more, impossible. In order 
to understand why this is so, we should briefly retrace the manner 
in which Kant conceptualizes what a “moral religion”, or what is 
the same thing, what a purely rational religion, a religion within the 
limits of reason alone, consists of.
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In the introduction to Die Religion Kant postulates roughly the 
same conception of the relation between morality and religion, 
which he had previously articulated in the Second Critique. Such a 
conception is summed up in the double edge formula: “morality in 
no way needs religion” (R 57 / 6:3), but “morality inevitably leads to 
religion” (R 59 / 6:6). It does not need religion because the moral law 
demands an unconditional compliance, this is, a compliance which 
makes abstraction of the consequences or of the end towards which 
the action might be oriented. This abstraction of consequences and 
ends defines the moral character of a decision, and it is utterly in-
compatible with a “moral” behavior grounded on the purpose of 
pleasing God. But Kant also thinks that reason is incapable of re-
nouncing completely to the representation of an end towards which 
the action is oriented. If such a representation cannot be the ground 
of one’s actions (in which case such actions could no longer be moral), 
the possibility must still remain that there is a representation of an 
end that does not precede the action (as its ground or subjective 
incentive), but rather follows it. After the question “What should I 
do?” has been answered: “obey the moral law out of pure respect for 
it and nothing else”, and after such a behavior has been adopted and 
exercised, the inevitable (and legitimate) question: “What can I hope 
for?” arises as a consequence of this behavior. For Kant, a “rational 
religion” is precisely one which, not being in any sense the ground 
or condition for moral actions, nonetheless arises as a consequence 
of the exercise of pure practical reason, in the form of this question 
concerning the end or consequences of this exercise as such: “What 
will come out of all this pure respect for the law?”.
In the Second Critique Kant had interpreted “immortality” and 
“God” as practical postulates, precisely in this respect. Although 
“immortality” as such must be postulated not in order to hope for a 
happiness in correspondence to moral worth, but rather to warrant 
an infinite progression that the always impossible and unattainable 
adequacy to the requirement of the law demands, “God” is in fact 
postulated as the condition for an (otherwise impossible) equilibri-
um between morality and happiness. But in Die Religion this relation 
between religion and morality appears to be somewhat different. 
At the outset of the Third Book which is concerned with tracing 
the developments by which the “good principle” overcomes the 
“evil principle” in the human condition, Kant asserts (in opposition 
to the double edge formula stated in the introduction to which we 
have just referred) that the human being needs an “ethical commu-
nity” in order to overcome this “evil principle”. Without an “ethical 
community”, says Kant (rehearsing a certain dose of fatalism and 
misanthropy that had already transpired in some passages of his 
analysis of “radical evil” in the First Book), any human association 
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is inevitably bound to corrupt the moral disposition of its members, 
and inevitably leads them to their doing each other “evil” (“envy, 
addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associ-
ated with these, assail the person’s nature, as soon as he is among 
other human beings” R 129 / 6:93). Thus, a community of people 
committed to the pure respect for the moral law and thus to the cul-
tivation of a good moral disposition is required for the overcoming 
of the propensity to “evil” in human nature8. This “ethical commu-
nity” is distinguished from a “juridico-political community” in that 
the former is bound to moral laws whereas the latter is bound to the 
public laws of the state and, consequently, whereas the compliance 
to the laws of the juridico-political community can be determined 
empirically, through mere observation of external behavior, the 
compliance to the moral laws (which requires goodness in the inner 
disposition) cannot be determined by the observation of the human 
eye. Thus, such an “ethical community” cannot be thought of with-
out the idea of God as the supreme legislator of this community, 
who is the only one capable of fathoming the “depths of the heart”. 
In such an “ethical community” the moral laws are, then, in this 
respect, regarded as divine commandments. 
This is, argues Kant, what defines a rational-moral religion in 
sharp contrast to its antipodes, which he calls throughout this text 
in several ways: “ecclesiastical faith”, “cultic religions”, “religions of 
rogation”, “counterfeit service”, etc. In these immoral (non-rational) 
religions the order of the relation between “moral law” and “divine 
commandment” is reversed: what are first recognized as divine com-
mandments (through revelation or tradition) are then considered 
moral duties. The problem with this inversion, for Kant, is that cer-
tain actions (ritualistic, cultic) that are not “in themselves” moral, are 
considered as moral duties. But, as we have tried to explain above, 
it is precisely this idea that there are certain actions which are “in 
themselves” moral what Kant’s analysis of the moral problem (in 
the Groundwork) and of “radical evil” (in Die Religion) has rendered 
deeply problematical, and has put into question; when the idea that 
an action has “in itself” moral worth independently of the inflexion 
of the will from which it arises is rendered problematical, the very 
ground if not of the difference itself, at least of the ability of recog-
nizing this difference between a “rational-moral religion” and all the 
other “bad” religions, is also seriously destabilized.
8 “[I]nasmuch as we can see, therefore, the dominion of the good principle is not 
otherwise attainable […], than through the setting up and the diffusion of a society 
in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue” […] “an association of 
human beings merely under the laws of virtue can be called an ethical community” 
(R 130 / 6:95).
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If the “moral religion” is defined as that in which moral worth 
becomes the condition sine qua non for the hope of a happiness that 
corresponds to this worth (a happiness of which God is the condi-
tion of possibility), a certain consciousness of this worth becomes a 
necessary criteria for distinguishing a moral (“true”) religion from 
a cultic (“false”) one. Kant states the distinction formulating the 
principle that “It is not essential, and hence not necessary, that every 
human being know what God does, or has done, for his salvation; 
but it is essential to know what a human being has to do himself in 
order to become worthy of this assistance” (R 96 / 6:52). But it seems 
to be essential to the distinction not only to know “what a human 
being has to do himself in order to become worthy”, but also that 
the self-consciousness of this worthiness is somehow possible. For if such 
consciousness of the progress towards the good (or as Kant himself 
says, of the process of “becoming a better person”) is not possible, 
then the awareness of the difference between a moral and an im-
moral religion is not possible either, since the moral religion is that 
which alone is conducive to moral improvement. Now, how is this 
consciousness of moral worth possible if external actions in them-
selves cannot tell us anything about the inner principles (the “bot-
tom of the heart”) from which they arise, and if this inner principles 
cannot ultimately be determined through self-examination either9, 
and thus remain utterly opaque, utterly inaccessible? If both empiri-
cal observation and introspection are discarded, what is, then, the 
criterion upon which it is possible to determine whether there is 
progress towards the good or not, and consequently whether a form 
of religiosity is “moral” or rather “superstitious” (cultic)? 
In several passages Kant argues that a certain “confidence” on the 
gradual realization of moral progress is a defining characteristic of 
the operation of a “moral religion”. Although absolute certainty is 
precluded from such a confidence, this confidence can nevertheless 
“legitimately” rely on an inference based on the observation of one’s 
conduct:
Without any confidence in the disposition once acquired, perse-
verance in it would hardly be possible. We can, however, find 
this confidence, without delivering ourselves to the sweetness 
or the anxiety of enthusiasm, by comparing our life conduct 
so far pursued with the resolution we once embraced. For, 
9 On the issue of the incapability of recognizing the deepest motivations of one’s own 
actions through mere self-examination or introspection Kant is, at least, as Freudian 
as Freud himself: “Indeed, even a human being’s inner experience of himself does 
not allow him so to fathom the depths of his heart as to be able to attain, through 
self-observation, and entirely reliable cognition of the basis of the maxims which he 
professes, and of their purity and stability” (R 106 / 6:63).
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take a human being who, from the time of his adoptions of the 
principle of the good and throughout a sufficiently long life 
henceforth, has perceived the efficacy of this principles on what he 
does, i.e., on the conduct of his life as it steadily improves, and from 
that has cause to infer, but only by way of conjecture, a fundamental 
improvement in his disposition […] on the basis of what he has per-
ceived in himself so far he can legitimately assume that his disposition 
is fundamentally improved. (R 110 / 6:68; my emphasis)
It is hard to think how can this passage be at all compatible with 
the radical external and internal opacity and invisibility of moral 
worth as inscribed in the depths of will (and there alone), an in-
visibility that has otherwise been stated by Kant in such a radical 
manner. For example: “it is absolutely impossible to settle with com-
plete certainty through experience whether there is even a single 
case in which the maxim of an otherwise dutiful action has rested 
solely on moral grounds” (G 23 / 4:407). This radical invisibil-
ity predicates precisely as inescapably illegitimate any conclusion 
about the moral disposition that starts from the mere “perception” 
of what one or anybody else does, i.e., from the “perception” of 
certain empirically observable course of conduct or set of actions. It 
seems that the transparency (however partial) of moral worth that 
this confidence distinctive of a “moral religion” implies, can only 
arise if the mere conformity to the moral law(s), or what Kant in 
other passages denigrates as a mere compliance to “the letter of the 
law”, acquires in itself the status of a positive and valid criteria of 
moral value. Only if what one does becomes intrinsically (i.e., in itself) 
valid independently of the inner disposition (the how) of that doing, 
can the inference from a “good conduct” to the inner maxim acquire 
any legitimacy. But the very assumption that the “what” of human 
conduct is morally worthy independently of the inner “how”, has 
been defined by Kant as the unequivocally distinctive sign of a 
morally unworthy attitude (R 84 / 6:37; quoted above)10. In other 
 10 It will certainly be worthwhile to articulate a connection between the most radical 
formulations in Kant’s moral theory of the rift between “the what” and “the how” of 
morality, and Kierkegaard / Climacus’s famous formulation of the distinction be-
tween “the what” and “the how” in the relation to God. Echoing Kant, Kierkegaard 
places all the worth in “the how”: “one [person] prays in truth to God although he 
is worshiping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the ‘true’ God and is therefore 
in truth worshiping an idol” (Postscriptum VII 168). Kierkegaard’s claim renders the 
“what” (what God?) completely irrelevant, and so precludes as inconsequential any 
distinction between a “true” and a “false” religion on the basis of the content assigned 
to “the what”. In the same way, Kant’s moral theory in its most radical formulations 
renders the “what” of moral conduct irrelevant, placing all the weight on the inner 
“how”. Thus, these formulations preclude any distinction between a “true” and a 
“false” morality based on certain specific content assigned to the “what” of moral 
conduct. Nonetheless, Kant retreats from the radical consequences of his moral theory. 
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words, the confidence on moral improvement that alone is capable 
of establishing the distinction between the “moral religion” from the 
“bad” ones is only possible if moral worth is no longer invisible. But 
Kant’s understanding of the moral problem asserts precisely that if 
“moral worth” is regarded as something visible it is no longer nei-
ther “moral” nor “worthy”. 
We have attempted throughout this paper to emphasize how 
Kant’s line of argument in Die Religion is marked by a profound ten-
sion and ambivalence: on the one hand, the delineation of a fracture 
and incommensurability between the visibility of human conduct 
and the invisibility of the will which is decisive in Kant’s analysis of 
the moral problem, and which alone enables him to effect the revo-
lutionary displacement of the center of gravity of moral worth to a 
hidden and inscrutable inflexion of the will; and on the other hand, 
a certain necessity to repair this fracture, to replace the incommen-
surability between the visible and the invisible, the observable and 
the hidden, with some kind of continuity and commensurability; the 
necessity of substituting the radical invisibility and inaccessibility 
of moral worth with some degree of transparency; the necessity, in 
sum, to make good and evil somehow visible. It is this necessity what 
we have tried to interrogate throughout this paper by showing: i) 
how it leads Kant’s analysis of radical evil to an aporia; ii) how it 
leads him, in the Groundwork, to foreclose a question that is in prin-
ciple consistent with his radical and revolutionary reformulation of 
the moral problem; and finally, iii.) by showing how the “hidden 
springs” of this necessity might well be explained by the manner in 
which this reversal or withdrawal from a radical invisibility towards 
an urgently needed transparency of moral worth, is the necessary 
condition for telling in a certain way the history of the world. One 
should not be surprised that religion (in its internal tearing between 
a “good one” and a “bad one”) is the main character in this story of 
history, even in the case of Kant. This privileged role of the distinc-
tion between a “true” and a “false” religion in the construction of a 
narrative of the history of the world is a common trait that marks 
the emergence of the Philosophy of Religion in modern western 
philosophy. But, with the appearance of this main character in the 
late Kantian text examined here, one could at least be alerted against 
the facile opposition between religion and reason that is sometimes 
hastily understood to be the crux of the legacy of the Enlightenment 
and modernity; and, thus, one could be alerted against a certain 
religion that might well hide itself under the appearance of “pure 
reason” in a manner, at least structurally analogous, to that in which 
The distinction between a “moral (true) religion” and “immoral (untrue) religion(s)” 
is the clearest indication of this retreat. 
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radical evil, according to Kant, hides itself under the appearance 
of virtue. On the other hand, if one notes how this religion hidden 
behind “pure reason”, amounts to the surreptitious transformation 
of Kant’s anti-economical respect for the law, anti-economical in 
the way in which it interrupts the means-end logic of instrumental 
rationality, into the law of the economy (i.e., into history) and the 
entire system of hegemonies and exclusions which such a “law” 
administers, then one might want to attempt to cling to this anti-
economical side of Kant’s pure practical reason, but running then 
the inevitable risk of confronting the strange structural affinity that 
this pure goodness might have with certain anti-economical mani-
festations of “evil”. 
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